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Response requested & rec'd. The State concedes that the ~
question whether a warrant i~ req'd for insta11ation"of ,S,
a pen register is open fun this Court, and that "there aJ'" ~
pears to be a split of authority on the subject. tt Howev~fl~
resp says that the decision below was right •• The 4th Ala.! §
vi>rotects the content of conversations, not theffa.ct that i ~
conversations transpired. Telephone users have no expee:4~.,
tation of privacy in the!numbers they dial since (1) the, ;1
7 realize that records of toll calls are kept and have no : 3: I
, clear awareness of the line between toll and local calls S·
nor of the phone co's actual record-keeping practices;
F
(2) they'; realize that the numbers called must be reveal ~ . .
to the phone co, since it is through the phone co's swi . rJ·
ing equipment that the calls are completed. Indeed, peo~~l
have even less expectation of privacy as to the numbers is,
dialed than as to bank records or conversations wi th wil'~~ Q .
informers, since in the former case there is absolutely i !~ f4
no content conveyed. Since there is no 4th Am protecti ~
in the latter cases, the absence of protection in the f
'"
is a fortiori. I agree with ~e~p~ but in view of the
1y strong conflict I would grant. The Court may, howev
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM want to wait til the con
b",'c \,\<:\'f~1 l~,S~
becomes more firmly cemented,
Octuber-2'., 1~'Ja- Ccnferentre11/25/78
AGL
-fri.s·'l!-4r-S~3-

No. 78-5374 C~ Y

SMITH (robber)

v.

SUMMARY:

3

Cert to Md. ct. App.
(Murphy, Smith, Levine, Orth1
Digges, Eldridge, Cole, dissenting)
State/Criminal

MARYLAND
1.

¥~

Timely

Does the installation of a pen register constitute a

search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?
2.

FACTS:

Ms. McDonough was robbed.

She gave police a description

of the robber and of a 1975 Monte Carlo that she had observed in her
neighborhood shortly before the robbery.

After the robbery, she began

receiving threatening and obscene phone calls from a man who identified

- 2 -

himself as the person who robbed her.

Police spotted a man who met the

;;
no

description of the robber driving a 1975 Monte Carlo.

Q
::

By tracing the

no

!4.

license number of the vehicle, police learned that the car was registereq~'
in petr's name.

....o

;;

At the request of the police, the telephone company

no

~
Il)

installed a pen register at its central offices to record the phone
~
did no~ q
numbers of all calls from the telephone at petr's residence. Police / . i:

/

obtain

a warrant or court order before installing the pen register.

~
:;r
~.

o'

F

Thereafter, the pen register showed that a call was made to. McDonough'~ ~.
Armed with a search warrant, police searched petrls home and

home.

~
~
o

....
found a notation of McDonough's telephone number next to petr's phone •. =
n
o

~ ..

",.

McDonough identified petr as the robber at a line-up.

At a pretrial

suppression hearing, petr argued that evidence resulting from the
installation of the pen register should be suppressed because absent a
court order or search warrant, the use of a pen register constituted an
illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The

trial judge denied the motion, petr was found guilty of robbery and
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

The Maryland Court of Appeals af-

firmed.
3.

DECISION BELOW:

The majority stated that under Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the question whether installation of a
pen register requires compliance with the Fourth Amendment depends on
"whether a telephone subscriber has a constitutionally protected expec-

((J,
""-',

tation that the numbers which he dials will remain private. II

The court

held that a subscriber does not have a constitutionally protected ex-·

'"

~

'0

3Q.
c:

n

a

- 3 -

:;-

nA~~aLion of privacy with respect to the numbers dialed

o

for two reason.~

=-

~

n

~

irst, every subscriber realizes that the phone company keeps records

f;"
~

~.

of toll calls and there seems no valid distinction between the expec-

<il

....
o

~

tat ions associated with local calls and toll calls because most sub-

~

equipment owned by a third party and therefore it is unreasonable to
-/ assume that the fact of one's call passing through the system will

rel'A~U ~,'

iJ

a total secret from the phone company.

While the Fourth Amendment

~
o

....

n

protects the content of conversations, pen registers do not reveal that I1Q~
content and they are regularly used by the phone company without a
order "for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fra\1d
and preventing violations of the law.
434

u.s.

159, 174-75 (1977).

II

2

<il

United States v. New York Tel.,

The court found support for its conclusions

in cases dealing with the attachment of transmitters to informants,
inspection of bank deposit slips turned over to the, bank, use of beepers,
and reading of mail covers, all of which either this court or other
courts have held do not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The majority

cited several cases in which courts have held that telephone subscribers
have no reasonable expectation that records of their calls will not be
made.

See,~,

(9th Cir.

Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 555 F.2d 254

1977)~

United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th eire 1975).
believe
The dissenters / that the installation of a pen register constitute

a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

While a subscriber

'

- 4 -

that completed long distance calls will be recorded, the

~
~

rl

~

does not expect that the phone company will monitor the
telephone numbers of local calls.

;'

a

o

=
en

contrary to the majority's view,

....o
~

subscribers are aware of their "local 'call" 'zone because, at least in

~

~

III

=
I:
en

Maryland, they must dial the prefix "1" before they can make a call

n

beyond that zone.

"The defendant, by the simple act of dialing local

:I.

....

'0

I::l
:<;.
~.

numbers', did not reasonably intend to reveal information: he merely

o'

P

made use of machinery in particular ways which, without the police intrusion, would have remained fully private."

They found the analogy

the transmitter-on-informer and bank deposit slip

cases unpersuasiv.

t""
~,
~
~

o
rl
o

....

a='
en

•

\-l{)t»'

oJ"ou.k
~~jW'fl ~

because the phone company is not a "party" to teleph_o)1e conversations
parties to the conversations or ba'Gk transactions •
the same sense as the informer and bank are' Mail cover cases also
distinguishable since anything written on the outside of an
is placed in the plain view of the public.

envelope

Finally, the dissenters noted

that several courts have held that the installation of pen registers is
subject to Fourth Amendment requirements.

See,~,

Southwestern Bell

Tel. v. united States, 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
u.s.

(1978): New York Tel. v. United States, 538 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.
V'.e.vl &
I
\5'/
1976), leert. denic~, 434 u.s. 1~9 (1977): United states v. Illinois Bell
Tel., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976): United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134
(8th Cir.), cert •. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr simply repeats the arguments of the dissenter:

He claims that there is a split among the lower'courts on this question
as evidenced by the cases relied on by the majority and dissenters and

- 5

that the court should grant cert in this case to resolve the conflict.
Finally, he argues that the following statement by Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring and dissenting, in united states v. Giordano, 416 u.s. 505,
553-54 (1974) "should be dispositive of this issue":
"Because a pen register is not subject to the
provisions of Title III, the permissibility of
its use by law enforcement authorities depends
entirely on compliance with the constitutional
requirements of the Fourth Amendment."
5.

DISCUSSION:

This Court has not yet determined whether pen

register surveillance is SUbject to the requirements of the Fourth
mente

The question was specifically reserved in united States v.

Tel., 434 u.s. 159, 165 n. 7 (1977).

And in a footnote following the

above-quoted statement by Mr. Justice Powell in Giordano, he stated

---------

he did not have to address the question whether the use of a pen

registe~

constitutes a search because, assuming the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment, its requirements were satisfied in that case.
554 n. 4.

416 U.S. at

The claimed split in the circuits on this question may be

~more appare~t than

real.

The court in John specifically declined to

decide whether the use of pen registers constitutes a search.

None of

the other cases really addressed the question whether use of the device
is a

search~

instead, they simply quoted the statement from Mr. Justice

Powell relied on by petr and assumed that the Fourth Amendment governs

'to .

installation of pen registers, apparently without recognizing that Mr.
Justice Powell declined to decide that question.

~ of

In any event, in all

the cases relied on by the dissenters, the Government had secured a

ld

Q.

=
::r
o

()
('l)

- 6 -

Q.

court order or warrant before installing the pen register.

Hodge, supt'l =
~
('l)

relied on by the majority, was a

§ 1983

action

~~inst

<":l
o

the telephone

;:
~

company in which the CA 9 held that, assuming state action, the expecta.. ~·
,

tion of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment attaches, to the
a

'

.........o

conte~;

s::

.

of/telephone conversation and not to the fact that the conversation

III

1:1

=
'"
..,
()

In clegg, supra, the CA 5 stated in dicta that the 'overnment'Bi ~
t::::;I
:;r
1;l'
use of a pen register would not be subject to the Fourth Amendment's
o'
F
conflict
requirements. Thus, there is no clear / in the "holdings ll of the ca
seem
cited, although the rpre~~c!~ons of the courts citedl
obvious and

place.

J

'those predispositions do differ.
Should the Court be interested in addressing this issue, despite
(' ,

~

the lack of a clear conflict below, this case may be a good candidate.
The opinions below are well researched and thoughtful, and the factual
setting of this case is uncomplicated and squarely serves up the issue.
There is no response, but I understand that one already ,has been
reque·sted.
Kravitz

10/20/78

CMS

101"J1/7

r
kr4~f

1P-

Op in petn.

No. 78-5374
The memo writer is correct that there is no rock-solid conflict
the circuits as to whether installation of a pen register constitutes a "search." Just the same, there is quite a bit of disagree~ among them.
CAs 2, 7 & 8 have assumed that installation of
pen registers is a search; in each case, however, the GovtJhag".~e
cured court orders authorizing th~ installations and the CAs held
that these orders were supported by probable cause and h~nce sa~s
fied the 4th Amend warrant requirement. In Ho*ge, CA 9 held that
installation of a pen register was not a searc , but confined its
holding to the facts of that case, where the telephone co was doing
,its own investigationrof' obscene,ca11s, rather than helping the
Govt investigate crime. In Clegg CA 5 likewise said that installation of a pen register was l19.t= a search; although, this was not the
"holding" of the case, it was a critical step in the chain of rea- ,'St
soning by which CA 5 reached its holding. Given the evident dispart+~
ty in approach taken by the CAs, the large number of pen register
•. ~:
cases that are bubbling up these days, and the fact that the "searclVr' ffi
question is open in this Court, I would be inclined to granteunless
the State's response is very convincing.
10/21/78
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This little case presents one question: whether the installat

E:it
~

of'a pen register constitutes a "search" for purposes of
the 4th Amen451 (')
•
0
ment, such that a warrant for' tts ,installation is required.

~
Everyone ol:t.

=
~

seems to agree that Katz, governs the case, and that Justice Harlan's

o
.....

E:it

~

two-pronged inquiry' is appropriate: first, did petr have" an actual

~

=
==

(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, if he did, is soc

..,'"n

-6'
.....

prepared to recognize that expectation' (objectively) as' reasonable?

t:1

<'
The parties disagree only as to how these questions should be answers': o!a:
.fl

as to pen registers.

t'"

s.:

The case seems quite easy to me.
in general probably do

~

I conclude that telephone

rJ

US~'I~
o
.....

entertain any expectation of'privacy' as t£, Q

.

the numbers they dial into the nat10nal

tele~hone

network; and that,

=

~

~
~

even if users do have some expectation of. privacy, this expectation is
not "reasonable."

Hence, the installation of a pen register is not a

"search" and no warrant is required.

~

"0
""l

o

1. FACTS

P-

=
n
t'l>

P-

The facts, which were stipulated, are as follows.
was robbed.

::j'

8

Ms Me Donough

~

She gave police a description of the robber and of a

t'l>

(j

o

it

1975 Monte Carlo she had observed near her home just before the rob-

~

0'

bery.

After the robbery, she began getting threatening phone calls

from a man identifying himself as the robber.

==
'".....
o
....
:::r

Police saw a man who

t'l>

~
~

met McDonough's description driving a 1975 Monte Carlo in McDonough's
neighborhood.

=
'"n
==

""l

By tracing the license plate number, police learned

>6'
....
I::i

:::r

that the car was registered in petr's name.

1;;'

0'

F

Ten days after the robbery, the telephone company (Telco), at

t""

s:
~

police request, installed a pen register at its central offices to re-

~
o

n
o

cord the phone numbers of all calls made from the telephone at petr's
residence. (A pen register records only the numbers dialed; it does
not reveal the contents of the call, or

.tt

w~ether

a

'"
the call was completed.)

Police did not get a warrant or court order before having
register installed.

(JQ
==

the pen

The register subsequently revealed that a call

was made from petr's residence to McDonough's phone.
got a warrant to search petr's house; that search

The police then

turned up

a notation of McDonough's name and number alongside pevr's phone._
Petr was arrested and McDonough identified him in a line-up as the robber.
At a pre-trial suppression hearing, petr contended that the installation of a pen register, absent a court order or warrant, was an
illegal search and seizure in violation of the 4th Amendment.

On petr's

theory, the evidence gained from the pen register (Le.; the fact that pet:
had called McDonough), and the evidence gained pursuant to the search
warrant issued in. part on the basis of the pen register data, had to be
suppressed.

The trial judge denied petr's suppression motion and petr

was convicted.

The Md CtApps granted cert directly to the trial court.

-2-

II. DECISION BELOW
The CtApps noted that this Court had reserved decision on the
applicability of the 4th Amendment to pen

re~isters.

416 US 505, 553-54 & n.4 (1974)- (LFP diss;£t\ng);
US 159, 165 n.7 (1977).

....

US v Giordano,

=t'l>

('j

us

o

v NY' Tel Co, 434

The q'l;1estion whether installation of a

~

d:

registeJ'~
o

was a "search" subject to the warrant requirement, therefore, had to be ~
t'l>

answered by

reso~t

to basic 4th Amendment principles, as enunciated in

Katz v US, 389 US 347 (1967).

Under Katz, the answer depended on whe

~

=
Bl

n
::I.

....

'0

a telephone subscriber has a constitutionally protected expectation

thal~
1;;'

the numbers he dials will remain private.

In seeking this answer,

~.
t"'

the CtApps adopted the two-fold test articulated by Justice Harlan in
his Katz concurrence: "first, a person [must] have exhibited an actual
--

~
~

S,
('j

(subjective) expeetation of privacy, and second, that expectation [must~
~

,

be one that society is prepared to recogniz.e as 'reasonable.'"

t

389 US '"

at 361.
The CtApps then applied this two-fold test to the facts of this
case.

As to actual expectations, of privacy, the court noted that an

expectation of privacy normally extends to the content ofa conversation, rather than to the fact" that a conversation took place or that a
particular number was dialed.

Most phone subscribers, moreover, are

aware that the Telco routinely-makes records of phone calls.

It is

true, of course, that the Telco usually maintains tool-call records only
of long-distance calls, not of local ones. Yet most
court suggested,

subscriber~,

the

are unaware of the precise boundaries of their 10-

cal dialing zones, especially when those zones don't coincide with geographical boundaries.

Further, the Telco often keeps records of all

calls from phones subject to a special rate structure.
(f

Hodge v Mountain

States Tel Co, 555 F2d 254, 266 (CA 9 1977) (Hufstedler, J, concurring).
Although it was difficult to know exactly how much privacy the average

-3I

Ye}~pe~cted

with respect to the numbers he dialed, the CtApps
generally possessed a general understanding that
electronic equipment and that

s~me

record of

calls was made.
Secondly, even if subscribers were vaguely aware that the Telco
did ?otkeep records of local calls, and if they consequently entertained
some expectation of privacy regardigg local numbers dialed, this did
not necessarily mean that society was prepared to recognize that expectation as "reasonable."

All subscribers utilize equipment owned by the

Telco: in order to complete a call, the subscriber must "convey" the
number to the Telco's switching equipment.

Under these circumstances,

it would be unreasonable for the subscriber to assume that the fact of
his call's passing through the network will remain a total secret to
the Telco.

Once it is conceded'that subscribers have no legitimate

expectation of privacy respecting long-distance calls, moreover, it
would be bizarre to make the existence of a constitutionally-protected
privacy interest depend on how the Telco defined its "local call zone"
or how it organized its billing policy.

If the Telco decided to

drop the flat monthly charge, for example, and to record all calls (local
and otherwise) for billing purposes, the Telco would effectively extinguish subscribers' privacy interest in the numbers dialed.

Once it is

conceded that subscribers have no 'privacy inter-est in toll-billing records, and that the Telco is free to keep whatever billing records it
chooses, it would be anomalous to say that subscribers have a "legitimatE
expectation of privacy" in locally-dialed numbers simply because the
Telco does not currently choose to keep records of them.
For these reasons, the CtApps concluded that subscribers have no
"legitimate expectation of privacy" with respect to any numbers they
dial.

The court derived support for this conclusion from three

analogou~

-4-

The first line consisted of cases like US v White,
(1971) (person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
made to informant "wired for sound") and US ~-Miller, 425
(bank depositor has ~o legitimate expectation of privacy
checks and deposit slips in bank's possession).

Just as the speaker

in White and the depositor in Miller "took the risk" that the third
party would turn the information over to the Govt, so a subscriber,
real~zing

Telc~,

that the

n~bers

he ,diaLs must necessarily be conveyed to the

"takes the risk" that it will in turn hand the information over

to the police.

The second line 'of cases involved mail covers, which

the CAs generally have approved.
formation on the outside of

In a mail cover, the Govt views in-

a sealed envelope travelling through the

mails; the Govt may learn the origin and destination of the envelope,
r--~~~

but not the contents of the letter itself.

A pen register was(~~=~

similar,: the Govt learns numerical data indicating the destination of
the call, but nothing whatsoever about the contents of the communication.
The third line of cases involved beepers, which the CAs again have
generally upheld.

Just as

a

person has no legitimate expectation of

privacy as to his location when he is travelling about in public, so
a subscriber has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers
he dials into the national telephone network.
For these reasons, the CtApps concluded that, even if subscribers
do have some expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial, this ex. pectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."

Congress, in exempting pen registers from Title III of the Omni-

bus Act, obviously expressed the judgment that such devices do not pose
a threat to privacy of the same dimension as the interception of oral
communications.

As this Court said in NY Tel Co, pen registers are

regularly used by the Telco, without court order, "for purposes of

-.::>-

dperations, detecting fraud, and preventing violations
these circumstances, any expectation of privacy as to
dialed over the phone network would be
Three judges dissented.

The~

unreason~b1e.

believed that subscribers do have

an 'expectation of privacy in their local calls, and that this expectation
was objectively "reasonable."

First of all, routine Telco activities

do not include the monitoring of local calls, since most customers pay
for the basic use of Telco equipment at a flat rate.
number of calls, moreover, are local calls.

The overwhelming

The_majority's assertion

tnat customers are unaware of the boundaries of local-call zones was,
in the dissent's view, mere speculation: in Md, at any rate, callers
had to dial the prefix "1" in order to get out of their local

area~

Secondly, subscribers' expectation of privacy was "reasonable."

True,

subscribers necessarily entrust, the numbers they dial to Telco electronic
equipment, but it cannot be deduced from this that 'subscribers voluntarily intend to transfer information to the Telco.

'"'"

Subscribers, "by the

Q)

'"'
0=
....u0

simple act of dialing local numbers, do not reasonably intend to reveal

tlJ)

information; they merely make use of machinery in particular ways which,

t'

without police intrusion,

c:l

;:s'"'
.sa=.J:J

wou1~

have remained fully private."

The dissent rejected the "analogies" the majority sought to draw

.~

from other lines of cases.

.~

~

....Q.,

White and Miller, in the dissent's view,

'CCJ

were inapposite: in those cases, the defendant made a knowing and volun-

=
=

tary communication to the third party, and thus truly "assumed a risk."

'"

c:l

~

..c::
....

The subscriber, by contrast, 'does not knowingly and voluntarily reveal

'"

information to the Telco.

Q)

....0

.sa
....=

Themail cover and beeper cases were likewise

irrelevant: in those cases, the defendant subjected his letters or his

CJ

~

'0

U

Q)

..c::
....

e

0

J=
"0
Q)

CJ

=
"0
0
'"'

Q.,
Q)

~

7

person to full public inspection; the subscriber, on the other hand, dia]
phone numbers in the privacy of his home, and "reveals" them only to the
inanimate switching equipment of the phone company.

-b-

III. CONTENTIONS

/,i;agrees :with the court below that the outcome here is governed
/and

ril~ewise

,applied.

agrees that -Jus t~ce Harlan's two-pronged inquiry is

Petr simply disagrees with the CtApps as to how the two

questions are to be answered.
(1) Did Petr Exhibit an Actual Expectation of Privacy?

Petr

contends that he did: by placing his call to McDonough in the privacy
of his home, petr evinced an intent to shut out the "uninvited eye or
ear" just as Katz did by shutting the door to his public phone booth.
Of course, despite petr's attempt to secure privacy, he necessarily
revealed the number he ,was dialing to the Telco's switching equipment.
As the dissent below said, however, petr did not thereby betray any
subjective intent to transfer information to the phone company; indeed,
(

since this was a local call, the Telco made no record of it at all.

By

making his call in the privacy of his home, petr took reasonable steps
to protect the number he dialed from curious members of the public at
large; by so doing, he manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.
The fact that the number he dialed was recognized as a pattern of beeps
or pulses by Telco switching machinery does not suggest that petr's
subjective expectation of privacy was any less.
(2) Ie Society Prepared to Recognize Petr's Subjective Ex+
pectation as "Reasonable"?

Petr suggests that the answer to this ques l

tion depends on a balancing of "privacy interests" against "effective
law enforcement interests."

On the one hand, the burden on law enforci i

ment should a warrant requirement for pen registers be imposed would
be slight. Obviously, it takes some time to get a warrant, but it take I
time to get any kind of search or arrest warrant; judging" from the nuo
I

ber of pen register cases

(~,

NY Tel Co) in which the FBI or po1icl

did get a court order prior to installation, petr suggests that the t

ing one is probably s+ight.

On the other hand, the

a warrant requirement would offer privacy interests is
Petr notes that pen registers can be abused: they may
converted into wiretaps by attaching earphones.
Duke L J 751, 759.

See Note,

Petr cites congressional. testimony about abuses

of wiretaps, and suggests that pen registers can be similarly abused.
In order to prevent "slippery slope" problems, petr says, a warrant
should simply he 'required for a pen register at the outset.

To the

CtApps' argument that subscribers have no "reasonable expectation of
privacy" because they entrust the numbers they dial to the Telco, petr
replies that this reasoning on1y.enhances the expectation of privacy.
If people had a choice as to whose apparatus they used when
communicating with others, the choice of the Telco's equipment might
suggest a voluntary decision to transfer information to a third party.
(,

But consumers in actuality have no choice--the Telco has a monopo1y-and thus a person's "decision" to reveal a number to the Telco cannot
be said to evidence a voluntary conveyance of information.
For these reasons, petr concludes that he had an actual expectation
of privacy" that this expectation was objectively "reasonable," and
that the logging of the numbers he dialed thus constituted a "search."
Since the search fell within none of the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement, it was presumptively "unreasonable" and hence'
violative of the 4th Amendment.
B. Resp.
Resp begins by emphasizing that a pen register does not intercept
the content of any communication.

As LFP noted in his Giordano dissent,

a pen register
is a mechanical device attached to a given telephone line
and usually installed at a central telephone facility. It
records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from that line.
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t does not identify the telephone numbers from which
incoming calls originated, nor does it reveal whether any
call, either incoming or outgoing, was completed. Its
use does not involve any monitoring of telephone conversations.
416 US at 549 n.l.

As this Court s&id in NY Tel Co, moreover,

Neither the purport of any communication between the caller
and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether
the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.
Furthermore, pen registers do not accomplish the "aural
acquisition" of anything. They decode outgoing telephone
numbers by responding to changes in electrical voltage
caused by the turning of the telephone dial (or pressing
of buttons on push button phones) and present the information in a form to be interpreted by sight rather than by
hearing.
434

us

at 167.

The only question in this case, therefore, is whether

the mere recordation of telephone numbers dialed by a subscriber constitutes a "search and seizure" for 4th Amendment purposes.

In answer-

ing this question, respagrees with petr and the CtApps that the two,2ronged test from Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence, should be applied.
(1) Did Petr Exhibit an Actual Expectation of Privacy?

Resp

argues that telephone users in general entertain no real expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial: as several CAs have said, people normally expect privacy as to the contents of their calls, not as to the
fact that they have placed a call to a certain number.

People realize

that the number they dial is necessarily communicated to the Telco, not
only for the purpose of completing the call, but also for billing and
other business purposes.

People likewise realize that records of phone

calls are kept, for they see lists of the long-distance numbers they've
called on their monthly bills.

The fact'that the Telco does not usually

keep records of all calls, resp-argues, is of no constitutional significance.

The facts that all 'numbers dialed are imparted to the Telco, and

that all numbers dialed are capable of being recorded by it, are enough
to negate any reasonable expectation of privacy in the information thus
divulged.

The constitutional irrelevance of any "long distance"/"local"

underscored when one considers that the signals going
a local call are transported by the same equipment that handles
~_~_nistance

calls.

This equipment is the necessary conduit of all

phone calls, and the "intrusion" effected by a pen register on the
dialer's privacy is identical regardless of what city he is calling.
Under these circumstances, it would bizarre to hold that the dialer's
constitutional rights depended on what the Telco's zone-definition practices happened to be.

Resp, following the CtApps, relies on White,

Hoffa, and Miller, emphasizing that the intrusion here is less than in
those cases, since in those cases the content of the communication was
at stake.

Pen registers, by contrast, do not intercept content at all.
(2) Is Society Prepared to Recognize Petr's Subjective Expec-

tation (If He Had One) as "Reasonable"?
are routinely used for a variety of
example, to find out

~hether

Resp notes that pen registers

purpos~s.

The Telco uses

the~,

for

a horne phone is being used to conduct a

business; to check for defective dials; to ascertain billing errors;
and to record all calls from phones subject to special rate structures.
Most importantly, pen registers are routinely used by the Telco to investigate customer complaints about obscene or harassing calls.

Forty-

?

,X, nine States now have statutes making abusive phone calls a criminal of-

fense, and society has recognized tllat pen registers may legitimately be
used as devices for detecting the persons responsible for such calls.
Numerous courts have approved the use of pen registers by the Telco,
as against "invasion of privacy" challenges, for the purpose of ferreting
out violators of the law.

Society's recognition that the Telco will

employ pen registers to investigate customer complaints--and that, when
the evidence is gathered, Telco will divulge it to the police--indicates
that an expectation of privacy in the numbers one dials is unreasonable.
In this case, of course, the Telco did not install a pen register on petrI:
phone sua sponte, but was requested to do so by police.

Yet this differ-

-,1.V-

obviously be significant for purposes of "state
really insignificant for purposes of "expectation
Once it is accepted that Telco will record numbers
detect misuse of the phone system, it is irrelevant to the dialer whether Telco is acting on its own or at the Govt's instance.
recognized that Telco's logging of one's numbers

Soci~ty

~~ p~rmissib1e

has

for any

number of legitimate purposes--bi1ling, correcting errors, preventing
abuse.

Law enforcement is simply one more such legitimate purpose.

Given this pervasive pattern of permissible recordation, a telephone
user cannot reasonably expect that any particular number he dials will
remain totally private.
After concluding its Katz analysis, resp replies to petr's suggested "balancing process."

Resp argues in limine that the premise of

petr's argument here is erroneous.

This Court has used a "balancing test"

to ascertain what sort of 4th Amendment protection' (a warrant, for
example, or something less) is appropriate in a given case.
'"'"

The "balanc-

ing test," in other words, assumes that the 4th Amendment is applicable,

~

""
=
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whereas the question here is whether pen registers effect a "search or

t'

seizure" such that the 4th Amendment comes into play at all.
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Even as-

suming that some sort of balancing is proper here, moreover, it would
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not, on resp's view, suggest a different result.

.fa

.~

On the one hand, the
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burden on law enforcement imposed by a warrant requirement would be sub-
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stantial: the time necessary to secure a warrant may be considerable,
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and the usefulness of pen registers will be eliminated entirely in
cases where reasonable suspicion, but no probable cause, exists.

On

the other hand, the privacy interests to be protected are slight, since
pen registers leave the contents of communications inviolate.
there any real possibility that pen registers will be abused,

Nor is
~,

by

cl::
"Cl
Cl)
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"Cl
0
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being converted into more insidious devices like wiretaps.

Law enforce-

ment officers and phone companies alike know the limits of their authori-

-

......

er Title III!, and no "slippery slope" from permissible pen registo impermissible wiretaps need be feared.

In any event, this

Court must presume that law enforcement officers will obey the law.

It

could just as plausibly be argued that a warrant to search "X" for "Y"
could be abused by police desirous of converting it into a "general
warrant."

Yet this possibility is obviously no reason for refusing

to issue the search warrant in the first place.
In sum, resp concludes that the installation of a pen register
effects no "search or seizure" within the meaning of Katz, and that
the 4th Amendment's warrant requirement is thus inapplicable.

This

conclusion, on resp's view, is mandated, not only on analysis of people's
realistic "expectations of privacy" in the numbers they dial, but also
on policy grounds.
IV. DISCUSSION.
For me, this is a very simple case.

I believe that the installa-

tion of a pen register does not constitute a "search or seizure" and

'"'"
~

'"'
=

that the decision below should be affirmed.
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Actual Expectation of Privacy.

The

average phone user,

I would suspect, does not harbour any significant expectation of privacy

..c
'"'

;.:s

regarding the fact that he has dialed a particular number on his phone.

=~

,S
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:~

All phone users are aware from their monthly bills that the Telco records

,~

....Q..

long-distance dialings.

'CC.l
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calls~are

C':I

~
~

Som~

users may infer--from the fact that local

generally governed by a flat rate, rather than a

per-c~ll

rate-

il
....

that the Telco does not usually record local dialings.

Yet I wonder how

'"
=

many subscribers consciously draw this inference: the Telco could have

C.l

any number of reasons for keeping track of local calls too--to .gauge the

0
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volume of calls over particular circuits, for example, or to get some

~
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idea of what a fair monthly charge would be:.

-

Phone users, in other words

know for a fact that the Telco records some calls, know for a fact that

elco has the facilities for recording all calls, and might well
suspect, if forced to think about it, that the Telco may have reasons
(unrelated to billing, perhaps) for recording local dialings in particulal
On a common-sense level, it seems hard to imagine that people would
seriously think that the numbers they dial into a computerized phone
network will remain a secret from the phone company.
The fact that petr dialed McDonough's number from his own home
does not, to my mind, call for any different conclusion.

Contrary to

petr's argument, Katz is quite different from this case.

Katz wanted

to keep the contents of his phone call private, and he reasonably took
steps toward this end by shutting the doors to his phone booth.

Yet

petr, by the mere act of dialing from home, could not keep the number
he was dialing "secret" from the phone company--regardless of where petr
called from, he would have to reveal that number to the phone company
in precisely the same way.

Petr, by calling from home, may well have

evinced a desire to keep the obscene contents of his calls secret; the
numbers he dialed are something else again.
B.

"Reasonable" Expectation of Privacy.

Even if petr here

had some expectation that the number he dialed would remain private, I
doubt that society is prepared to recognize this expectation as reasonable.

Everyone concedes that a person can have no legitimate expecta-

tion of privacy in the long-distance numbers he dials.

The Telco keeps

routine business records of these numbers, and this Court's cases establish that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in business
records furnished to a third party.

Everyone concedes, moreover, that

the Telco in some circumstances does record all dialings from a particula
residence--to check billing errors, to monitor equipment malfunctions, to
trace harassment calls--and that the Telco could rec6rd all dialings if
it chose to.

Given this, to make the existence of a constitutionally-

protected privacy interest contingent on the fortuity of a private

's billing practices would be most bizarre.
that we are interpreting.

It is, after all,

When a person dials a number--

any nurnber--he takes the risk that the Telco will record that number for
a variety of legitimate business purposes.

Having taken that risk,

the dialer can claim no reasonable expectation that the number should
remain his little secret.
I think this result is consistent with the trend of this Court's
cases.

Viewing the matter broadly, one may suggest that there are two

types of "surveillance" cases.

One group consists of cases involving

mail covers, visual surveillance, (through binoculars if necessary),
b-eepers; and the like.

These various "devices" are similar in that

they take in what might be called the "externals" of people's activity-their physical location in space, their name and address, the destination
of their movements and correspondence.

These devices, in other words,

keep track only of that which one must necessarily reveal to others in
conducting one's affairs.

The other group consists of cases involving

wiretaps of phone calls or opening of letters.

Here, where surveillance

necessi'tates taking in the contents of people's communications, the
4th Amendment applies and a warrant is necessary.
view, belong quite firmly in the former group.

Pen registers, in my

Pen registers, like

mail covers, beepers, and visual surveillance, take in no content: they
take in only the facts that the dialer must necessarily· reveal to others
(here, the phone company) in going about his business.

Pen registers

reach only the "externals" of cornmunication--the bare fact that a number
has been dialed.

Just as one mp.st "reveal" the outside of an envelope

in order to get it delivered, so one must reveal the number one dials
in order to get the call completed.

To the extent that one necessarily

discloses certain data for the purpose of using modern methods of communi
cation, one pro tanto surrenders any "expectation of privacy" as to the
data necessarily disclosed.

-14-

Finally, to hold that installation of a pen register is a "search, I
and thus to hold that such installations are subject to a warrant requirement, would, in my view, Lmpose a serious burden on law enforcement.

It is my understanding that 'pen registers are customarily used

in the investigative phase of criminal proceedings: pen registers, that
is,

~re

used to help get evidence sufficient to make out probable cause

to arrest or search.

_This was the pattern

i~

this case: the police

had a suspicion of petr, but perhaps not probable cause; they installed
a pen register, and that produced a key fact--that petr had
McDonough.

ca~led

On the strength of that fact (plus earlier evidenc,e) the

police got a search warrant; that search turned up yet more incriminating evidence, and the police then had probable cause to

As

arres~.

the investigation in this case reveals, therefore, the police

~ften

may not have probable cause at the tLme they need to install a pen
regist~r;

if a warrant is required for all installations, therefore,

pen registers will be useless at the early stages of investigations
where the police have nothing but a strong suspicion.

v.

CONCLUSION

I conclude that the installation of a pen register is not a search

....l:lo

,'5

for 4th Amendment purposes, and hence that no warrant is
to such installations.

til

::I

~

~

requi~ed

,

should be aff'd.

Accordingly, the decision of the Md CtApps

prior
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QUESTIONS

For petr:
You have argued that

telephon~

users have an "expectation of pri-

vacy" as to the local numbers they dial because the telephone company
does not normally keep records of local calls.

Does not your argument

mean that the existence vel non of a constitutionally-protected privacy
interest will depend on the fortuity of a private corporation's billing policies at any point in time?
you as odd?

Does this mode of reasoning strike

HAB--

Here's a draft of Smith v. Maryland.

It's a short, rather un-

scholarly opinion, rather befitting the case, which really requires
little more than some common sense and a straightforward application
of

~,

Miller, and White.

There were five votes at Conference to

hold "no search," and that's the way I've written the opinion; this
follows your Conference vote and my bench memo.
No

7l:,th8.l~
LC

On pp. 5 & 6, I've included cites to Rakas v. Illinois,
was decided in December of this Term.

I've merely put "blank U.S."

cites in the text, but I thought that you might like to know the slip
opinion references for sake of convenience.

Here they are:

Page 5: Majority--slip op. at 15, and note 12.
LFP concurring--slip op. at 1, 2.
BRW dissenting--slip op. at 9.
Page 6: Majprity--slip op. at 15 note 12.
LFP concurring--slip op. at 2.
I've included in the pile of materials everything you should need to
do the opinion: a Cornell L Rev article; a Drake L Rev article; xeroxes
of the Baltimore and DC phone books; and the advance sheets of Maryland
Reports containing the opinion below.
should be in the Justices' Library.

AGL

,5/14/79
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I;mployee Identific~tion
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,

. It is a crirninal offinse under~, .
Maryland law for any person know~
ingly to give or cause to be given'
any false alarm of fire. This offense
is punishable by fine and/or im:.:

If ina manner' reasonably expected
to annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or
embarrass one or. more persons; or
2. Repeated Calls-·
If with intent to annoy, abuse; torment, harass, or embarrass o[1e or
more persons;.or ,-:' . . '
3. Any Coniment-.
',.
Request, suggestion, or proposal'
which is obscene; lewd, lascivious, \ "
filthy or indecent. , . ' ,', : ,
These offen~e's ar~ punishable by" .
fine and/or imprisonm~nt "naddition, under Federal' law itls also.~~,':
criminal offense for anyone who·
knowingly permits any telephone'
under their control to be used in In'terstfite<orForeigrrcommunications
'. for·any.of th~. purposes noted:" .
: above:, \:,~;.«,:~:;~:·I{i'::j,; ". I, .::~'
I
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False Fire Alarms'

It is a criminal offens'e under
Maryland and Federal Laws for any
person to make use of telephone
facilities and equipment for:
1. Anonymou$ Calls-

,

I

'\
J"

. :' ~ " I t ' · " .

Abusive Calling
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For y'ou~ proie'c~icm, 'every employee
carries an official identification cara
; h ' h'
h
h
. s oWing IS or er name, p otograp',
and signature, If you have the sligh:
p r i s o n m e n L , , ; est doubtaboljlpersons who say'
they are from the TelephoneComEmergency Calls on
pany; please ask to see their card.

P
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arty mes

:.
Fraud Penalties

'.

It is a 'criminal offense under Maryland
law to refuse to relinquish the use ·of a For your protection, new equipme'nt
party line immediately when informed and proc'edures en<;lble the Telephone
that it is needed for an emergency
Company to detect and :investigate
call. It is also an offense to state"
fraudulent calls. State J!'lW prOVides
falsely th!'lt a party line is needed for' that no person shall defraud or;' .
ao emergency call. The law defines" . attempt to. defraud the. Telephone
"emergency" as "a situation in whith .' Company of its lawfulcharges.
property or human life are In je'opardy Violators, upon conviction, may be
an,d the prompt summoning of. aid <, sUbject:to imprisor1f11\ent for up to 6
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by fine and/or imprisonment.
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Some Ba~ic Guidelines ;,
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. . The Telephone Compal)Y WiUassist
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HAB-This looks fine--quite a clean copy.
able to find.

I marked the: typos I was
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As to the repetition of phraseology at pp 5-6, I see what
you mean. However, I did not intend the two sentences to say the
~
same thing. The sentence on p. 5 says merely that petr is claiming
,~
some legitimate expectation of privacy. The question then becomes,
So
~expectation of privacy as to what?"
This in turn depends on the
~
nature of the Govt intrusion, which is described at pp 5-6. Based
:
on the limited capabilities of pen registers--all they do is record
~
the, numbers dialed--the draft concludes that petr' s claimedrexpecfa; ! 9.'
tion of privacy must relate only to the numbers he dialed.' Hence the! 'S.j
sentence on p 6 that you questioned: "petr's claim necessarily rests ; S!
upon a claim that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy regardinl; g:'
the numbers he dialed on his phone." This sentence does say somethinl!.? .
different from the sentence on p 5, although as you rightly point "
t"'iii
out there is a lot of overlap in the introductory part of the sentenc.¥~~;
Can you think of a way to tone down the overlap, while preserving
J '.5
the distinction? One way might be to change "infringed a 'le~itimate;; 0
expectation of privacy' petr held" on p 5 to "infringed some legitimlff (;;1
expectation of privacy' petr held."
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 24, 1979

Re:

78-5374 - Smith v. Maryland

Dear Harry:
The point I intend to make in a short concurrence may be one that you will be willing to
cover in your opinion, in which event I will
simply join you. It relates to the significance
of the individual's actual or subjective expectation
of privacy. I, would like to make sure that an individual citizen does not lose his Fourth Amendment
rights in either of two hypothetical situations:
1. Assume that a new Adolf Hitler
installs nationwide loudspeakers notifying
the entire populace that henceforth all
homes shall be open to unwarranted and unlimited search. Such publicity would
eliminate any actual subjective expectation
of continued privacy, but surely would not
destroy the citizen's Fourth Amendment
protection.
2. Assume that a refugee from a
totalitarian country is unaware of our
traditions of freedom and incorrectly
believes that all his telephone conversations are being monitored by the secret
police. He should nevertheless retain his
Fourth Amendment protections.

- 2 -

I do not believe your opinion is intended to
disagree with either of these assumptions. However,
unless something. similar to these examples is
expressly disclaimed, I am afraid that the emphasis
on actual expectation of privacy·may be subject to
misreading. Do you think you could put in an
appropriate footnote to make it clear that the
emphasis on actual expectation does not include this
sort·of situation?
Respectfully,
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 24, 1979

RE:

No. 78-5374- Smith v. Maryland

Dear Harry:
As a post script to my earlier letter,
this thought has occurred to me. Perhaps the
subjective or actual expectation of privacy is
most important when we are evaluating a claimthat Fourth Amendment protection should· be
extended into a' new'a'rea--wiretap ·in· Katz and
pen registers here--but would not be relevant
in situations, such as house searches, where
Fourth Amendment protection is well recognized
in our decided cases. This is just a suggestion.
Respectfully,

fL
Mr. Justice Blackmun

.

HAB-I've seen both of JPS' letters of today, and have drafted
a new fn. 5 to .address his concerns.

I was somewhat hesitant about

adopting the suggestion in his second letter--that different inquiries
would be proper depending on whether an "old" or "new" mode of police
surveillance was being used.

My hesitancy, I suppose, can be traced

to uncertainty about the ramifications of such a per se rule.

I

did, however, try to accommodate JPS' second letter somewhat by
writing, "alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms," in
the footnote.

5/24/79
P.S.

JPS' clerk said this might be satisfactory to his boss.

AGL

If this looks OK, I can run it by JPS and WHR to see if they're

agreeable; then it could go to the printer in time for circulation tomorrow.

Alternatively, we could just circulate it in typed form.
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18-5374-0PINION

SMITH v. :MARYLAND

Illinois,-- U. S. - , - , and 11.12 (1978); id., at-', ..,.--(concurring opinion); id., at ---.-, (dissenting' opinion) ;
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1,7 (1977); Unitea,
States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409
U. S. 322, 335.:..336 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U. S.
74~, 752 (1971); (plurality opinion); Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U. S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. I, 9
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(1968). This in uiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in
his atz concurrence, eplbraces two discrete questions.
first is whether the inaividual, by his conduct, has "exhibited
ail aCtual (subjective) expectation of privacy," 389 U. S., at
361-whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown that IIhe seeks to preserve lsomething] as private." Id., at 351. The second question is whether the
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonabl~,' " id., at 361whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual's·
ex ectation, viewed objectively, is "justifiabl'[e]" under the
circumstances.
., at 53. See Raka's v. Illinois, - ' U.S.,
at - n. 12, id., at (concurring opinion); United States v.
White, 401 U. S., at 752 (plurality opinion).

B
In applying the Katz analysis to this case, it is important
'to begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activity that is challenged. The activity here took the form of
installing and using a pen register. Since the pen register
waB installed on telepllone company property at the telephone
company's central offices, petitioner obviously cannot claim
that his IIproperty'" ,vas invaded or that police intruded into
1:',
"constitutionally protected area." Petitioner's claim,
rather, is that, notwithstanding the absence of a tr~spass, the
State, as did the Government in Katz, infringed a "legitimate
expectation of privacy" petitioner held. Yet a pen register
differs significantly from the listening device employed in
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Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' two-pronged

inquiry would 'provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment pro tee
tion.

For example, if the Government were 'suddenly to announce on

nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact enterta
any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and
effects.

Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian

country~

un-

aware of this Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police
were continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the contents of his calls might
be lacking as well.

In such circumstances, where an individual's

subjective expectations had been "conditioned" by influences alien to
well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was.

In determining whether

a "legitimate expectation of privacy" existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.

24, 1979

John.

letters, I suggest
the following:
,

In
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On'page ~ of tbeoplnton, 10th line, insert
"normallY·
~foJ=~ tb•. word "embraces."
'
.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 24, 1979

Re:

78-5374 - Smith v. Mar~land

Dear Harry:
Many thanks. Your changes completely
resolve my problem. I definitely will not
write separately.
Sincerely,

:JL
Mr. Justice Blackmun
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Smith v Maryland, No. 78-5374 (TM dissent circulated 6/8/79)
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I have studied TM's dissent, and don't think it necessitates
W
any response on our part. TM predicates his dissent on his own disgo
sents in Schultz and Miller, and on JMH' s dissent~ in Wh1t:e,. TM, in
,~
other words, seems to agree that our result isconsJs.t:ent_witlj.t:l1.e Cour*l ~
opinion in Miller, and dissents here only because he dissented there. i ;
TM's theory that persons retain an expectation of privacy in infora:
mation they divulge to third parties for a limited purtose, dissent
§
at 1, 2, 7, was expressly rejected by this Court in Mi ler, as our
~
quotation from that opinion, draft at 8-9, makes clear. TM's theory
: ~.
is extremely broad--it would give telephone users a legitimate expecta'"'!,;
tion of privacy, not only in local numbers the Tel Co does ~ record, ~3:
a.lso in toll-call numbers the Tel Co does reoord for billing purposes.
S·
TM's theory, in other words, would give telephone users a legitimate
F"
expectation of privacy in the Tel Co's business records. Yet Miller
~,
held that a depositor has no legitimate expectation of privacy in a
~
bank's business records.
~
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WJB, PS, and TM originally voted to
WJB may be able to join TM's dissent without
oPinion, however, may pose problems for PS.
opinions in Miller, Couch, and the plurality
TM's dissent is predicated on a rejection of
don~t see how PScan join it.

dissent in this case.
difficulty. TM's
PS joined the Court's
opinion in White. Since
those opinions, I really

(")

o

=

a
t il

j

i

MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
RE:

DATE:

HAB

AGL
Smith v Maryland, No 78-5374 (PS dissent circulated 6/13/79)

6713779

I've read PS' dissent and don't think it calls for any respons
PS makes no effort to distinguish this case from Miller and White,
of which he joined. His theory, basically, seems to be the same as
TM's, although TM's frankness prevents PS from joining that opinion
directly.

